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As Egypt approaches the fifth anniversary of its 2011 
uprising, one would be forgiven for assuming that a 
major challenge to the regime of President Abdel 
Fattah el-Sisi was gathering coherence and force, based 
upon its panicked and paranoid current actions. But 
such a conclusion would be misplaced. The regime’s 
overblown fears of a largely neutered opposition raise 
a pertinent question: What is driving the Egyptian 
security establishment’s overbroad and suffocating 
repression?
The run-up to January 25 has seen a major crackdown 
that has included arrests, disappearances, random 
searches (including random surveillance of social 
media accounts1), the shuttering of nonpolitical cultural 
fora such as art galleries, and a heightening of visa 
monitoring for foreigners. For this upcoming symbolic 
date, the regime will not be caught unaware and flat-
footed—it believes that the mistakes of 2011 will not be 
repeated any time soon.
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Speaking to Reuters, an official at Egypt’s Homeland 
Security Agency explained the state’s motivations for 
the crackdown quite bluntly, stating that “We have 
taken several measures to ensure activists don’t have 
breathing space and are unable to gather, and several 
cafes and other meeting places have been closed, while 
some have been arrested in order to scare the rest.”2  
Whereas late 2010 was marked by creeping 
dissatisfaction, increasing boldness, and stepped-
up organizational efforts among opposition actors, 
there are no corollaries in today’s Egypt. While the 
government continues to fare poorly in terms of 
overall performance, political life is stunted by fear and 
fragmentation, and there are few avenues that allow 
for the amplification of dissatisfaction into a broad-
based challenge to the regime. Opposition forces are 
fragmented and intimidated, while the regime, the 
state, and social elites retain a baseline of cohesion, 
and domestic and regional instability have produced 
quiescence in some sectors of society. 
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It is clear that 2016 will not be the year of the next 
Egyptian uprising, let alone revolution. Yet, despite 
indications that, for the time being, the regime is safe 
from any popular threat, it is behaving as if it faces 
an imminent challenge. Its actions reveal a deeply 
ingrained worldview in which even minor forms of 
dissent and nonconformity are no longer permissible.
AN UNDER-PERFORMING AND 
STILL-CONSOLIDATING REGIME
Following the ouster of Muslim Brotherhood president 
Mohamed Morsi, the Sisi regime inherited a daunting 
set of political, economic, and security challenges. In 
this environment, the regime has not performed well, 
hindered by inexperience, a lack of vision, and the 
primacy of its concentration on the security sphere. 
Despite the huge openings afforded by the post-
Mubarak transition, the political turmoil, instability, 
violence, and repression of the transitional period 
have retarded the maturation of political life and 
atomized the political class. Some of this political stasis 
is by design, and is seen by the regime as a pathway 
to producing quiescent, dependent, and malleable 
political allies beyond the state. This can clearly 
be seen in the circuitous and drawn out efforts to 
produce an acceptable parliamentary outcome. The 
lack of coherent and robust political parties has made 
the prospect of organizing political life, even within 
controlled boundaries, more ad hoc and time-intensive.
 
The regime’s efforts to defang the political class, 
however, will create other problems, and over time may 
not be wholly successful in its chief aim of producing 
orderly and wholly predictable politics.  Operationally, 
weakening political life in Egypt in effect produces a 
weak “political infrastructure” that will be ineffective 
in advancing any state initiatives. Without this larger 
network of effective allies, governance has remained, 
and will remain, an incredibly narrow endeavor, the 
purview of the president and the small opaque group 
of advisors surrounding him. As a result, any failures 
of governance will not be perceived as shared by the 
larger political class, but rather focused on Sisi himself. 
Nowhere is the need for better governance more 
evident than the floundering Egyptian economy. The 
economic situation inherited by the Sisi regime was 
difficult, and Egypt still will need years to recover from 
recent setbacks. Since the uprisings of 2011, political 
instability and escalating violence have undermined 
Egyptian economic growth, crippled the country’s 
outsized tourism sector, and hindered foreign direct 
investment. As Amr Adly notes, this has meant that 
Egypt has been “dependent on massive capital inflows 
in the form of aid and cheap credit from the Gulf 
countries to fill the ever-widening financial gap.”3  
The inflow resulting from this approach has been 
insufficient in and of itself to overcome the negative 
impact of regional and international economic 
turbulence and poor economic decision-making. The 
Sisi regime’s initial plans to ease budgetary woes through 
subsidy reforms have stalled, and the grand project-
based approach to economic stimulus has lacked depth 
and planning. The end result is that, despite economic 
stabilization following the ouster of Morsi and the 
election of Sisi, security risks and a lack of consistency 
and predictability in policy planning continue to bedevil 
Egypt’s economy. As Adly notes, “in the medium term, 
Egypt needs to address its more structural problems 
and go beyond mere crisis-management.”4 To date, 
that has been impossible, not only due to exogenous 
factors, but also the current limitations of governance: 
the Sisi regime lacks economic vision, and the state and 
the political class are not in a position to initiate such 
structural reforms. 
To be fair, not all of the state’s fears are imagined, 
and some, particularly with respect to terrorism and 
anti-state violence, are rooted in genuine threats. 
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The security situation has posed a major challenge 
to current efforts at consolidation and normalization, 
exacerbated by regime strategy and tactics in both the 
political and security sectors. As Mokhtar Awad has 
argued, “Egypt is facing what is shaping up to be the 
deadliest and most complex insurgency in its modern 
history.”5 Awad has divided this insurgent threat into 
three broad categories: 
Sinai-based jihadists affiliated with the self-
proclaimed Islamic State and with a limited 
operational presence in the mainland (the 
populous heartland of Egypt along the 
Nile valley), mainland-based Salafi jihadists 
who tend to be supporters of al-Qaeda or 
affiliated with al-Qaeda, and a new category 
of non-Salafi-jihadi groups made up of Islamist 
supporters and some members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.6  
To this assessment one could also add the threats posed 
by the chaos in neighboring Libya and the increased 
jihadi penetration in that country. 
These cumulative security threats had gathered pace 
following the ouster of Morsi, and the sophistication, 
tempo, and scope of attacks had continued to increase, 
particularly in the first half of 2015.7 However, since 
that time—and despite what is assumed to be the 
most high-profile terrorist attack in recent years, the 
alleged November 2015 downing of a Russian charter 
jet departing from Sharm el-Sheikh—security trends 
have stabilized, and there appears to be a generalized 
leveling of security incidents.8  
Whether such levels are sustainable over time 
remains an open question, particularly as the regime’s 
counterinsurgency practices, in both the realm of politics 
and security, have often exacerbated underlying trends. 
Recent events suggest the existence of an intractable, 
resilient, and persistent insurgent and terrorist threat, 
but one that does not yet pose a systemic challenge to 
the state, particularly as attrition levels have decreased. 
This is most noticeable in mainland Egypt, where the 
tempo and scope of attacks have recently lessened. 
While the Sinai has proven much more volatile, the 
spillover into mainland Egypt and the country’s major 
population centers has remained fairly limited. In this 
sense, the security situation, at current rates of violence, 
remains a profoundly negative but manageable threat. 
And Egypt’s disastrous experience with domestic 
jihadism and insurgency in the 1990s also seems to be 
inhibiting the rise of the more indiscriminate forms of 
terrorism that have plagued portions of the Arab world 
in recent years. 
In addition to and exacerbated by these factors, the Sisi 
regime itself remains stuck in the mode of consolidation, 
not having stamped its full authority over the state and 
its bureaucratic organs. The challenging process of 
reconstituting and managing an Egyptian state that 
had decayed prior to the uprising and had been further 
damaged by the uprising and the indeterminate drift 
of the immediate post-Mubarak years remains ongoing 
and unfinished. 
IS INSTABILITY STILL 
SUSTAINABLE?
Egypt’s present condition is bleak and troubling, with 
little to encourage any form of optimism. But structural 
conditions within the country and the broader regional 
environment continue to suggest that Egypt’s instability 
remains sustainable.
Despite the security establishment fears that the 
tactical alliances that propelled the January 25 uprising 
may be reprised, there is no real sign that the existing 
rift between the Islamist and non-Islamist camps will 
be mended in the near-to-medium future. In this sense 
political fragmentation within and among opposition 
and potential opposition forces endures. 
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In the face of severe regime repression and pressure, 
the Muslim Brotherhood itself has also fragmented 
and no longer appears to function as a coherent whole. 
The group was legally designated as a terrorist entity, 
and mere membership has become dangerous and 
prosecutable. The Brotherhood now lacks the capacity 
to mobilize and sustain major public protests. Most of the 
Brotherhood’s most recognized and senior leaders are 
now imprisoned or in exile. These circumstances have 
made centralized decision-making near impossible. 
However, the prospect of localized autonomy 
has created major challenges for an organization 
accustomed to rigid hierarchy and zealously committed 
to the maintenance of organizational coherence. In the 
face of radicalizing cadres, this has forced much of the 
leadership into a muddled compromise on the issue 
of violence as an acceptable tool to achieve political 
aims. These strains now jeopardize the Brotherhood’s 
organizational structures and ideology. The end 
result of the Brotherhood’s gamble to force a frontal 
confrontation with the state in June 2013 appears 
to be a serious breakdown in the Brotherhood’s 
organizational integrity. This fragmentation and 
radicalization of segments of the Brotherhood boosts 
hardline views within the state’s security establishment 
about the future of the group, and makes the prospect 
of any kind of rapprochement among opposition forces 
even less likely.  
The success of the 2011 uprising was predicated on 
the short-lived but potent form of tactical alliance 
among the broad spectrum of opposition actors and 
organizations, which produced fleeting opposition 
solidarity against a crumbling regime. Mubarak’s fall 
could not have happened without the collapse of the 
police and the eventual neutrality of the military, which 
envisioned a beneficial future for both the institution 
of the armed forces and the Egyptian state that was 
not tethered to the immediate fate of Mubarak. While 
internal competition and disputes within the regime 
have only intensified and sharpened since the chaotic 
and threatening period immediately following the 
military’s July 2013 ouster of Morsi, the regime and 
the state show no signs of imminent ruptures or rifts 
that could threaten overall stability. Similarly, elite 
cohesion endures, despite increased frustrations with 
the Sisi regime and the country’s trajectory. This uneasy 
cohesion rests not upon deep-rooted support for Sisi 
and his leadership—although Sisi does enjoy durable 
sources of support—but rather stems from a sense of 
collective threat born of the fears of downside risks. The 
near-collapse in 2011 of the web of power and influence 
of traditional elites and the security state has bred a 
renewed determination to maintain their dominant 
position and to not allow internal competition and 
divides to reach a level that could expose the regime 
and the state to serious external threat.
Furthermore, the pathways to bottom-up change 
remain distant. The boldness to challenge the state 
that gathered momentum over the decade prior to 
2011 has understandably receded in the face of the 
regime’s unmitigated repression. That repression 
has stunted political life and aggravated underlying 
militant trends, but it has undeniably been successful in 
intimidating political actors and chilling the possibility 
for mass mobilization and protest. More broadly, and 
despite increasingly challenging economic conditions, 
Egyptian society remains fearful and fatigued, both by 
the tumultuous period of failed transition and by the 
negative regional examples of state failure and collapse.
The overall picture for the foreseeable future is one of 
generalized dissatisfaction without a channel or vehicle 
to translate such sentiments into broad-based political 
form or action.
PARSING MOTIVATIONS
In this light, the initial question remains: In the face 
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of inchoate and manageable threats, why does the 
Egyptian regime betray a sense of panic and fear? 
When seeking answers to this question, it is important 
to note the balkanized nature of the state and the 
initiative, often negative, demonstrated by individual 
and institutional actors. It is often a mistake to impute 
collective intent when viewing these actions taken in 
the name of the state. However, it also would be faulty 
to understand this escalating crackdown as a wholly 
uncoordinated effort. 
There are several plausible explanations as to why 
the regime is going to such lengths to repress any 
and all forms of existing and potential dissent. First, 
this repression can be seen as a preemptive approach 
to counter any gathering threats, based on the 
assumption of future and growing vulnerabilities. In the 
late Mubarak era, certain forms of political organizing 
and dissent were allowed room to operate in what was 
then perceived to be a controlled political environment. 
While repression was often ferocious, its targets were 
selective. This approach created a safety valve of sorts 
for the Mubarak regime, but it also eventually allowed 
a vibrant opposition community to grow and expand, 
producing a critical mass that came to the streets in 
January 2011. Such efforts will no longer be tolerated. 
Second, since the ouster of Morsi, the security 
establishment has been motivated in part by its 
sense of grievance and revenge, stemming from the 
humiliations of the 2011 uprising and the collapse of 
the police. The unchecked impulses of an ascendant 
security establishment have produced an institution 
bent on quashing any forms of dissent. In this sense, the 
reimposition of order is understood to be predicated 
upon the reforming of previously existing and rigid 
hierarchies between police and civilians and between 
elders and youth. 
Relatedly, the security establishment clearly believes in 
the efficacy of repression and fear as tools to produce 
acceptable outcomes: order, stability, and a quiescent 
political class and citizenry. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the current 
regime is a paranoid regime that believes many of the 
conspiracy theories it peddles, producing irrational 
responses. It is often assumed that the conspiracy-
addled narratives offered by state media and 
encouraged by the security establishment are a cynical 
ploy to redirect anger and buttress regime support. But 
such assumptions are often mistaken.
Based on numerous interactions with members of 
the security establishment, it is abundantly clear that 
many within the Egyptian regime have deeply held 
and outlandish beliefs in conspiracy theories about the 
myriad threats facing Egypt. Of course, as discussed 
above, Egypt does face significant threats, but often 
the focus on the implausible and the imaginary diverts 
precious attention away from existing reality. Speaking 
to Buzzfeed, Ramy Raoof, an Egyptian digital security 
expert, suggested that the random searches of 
social media accounts were an attempt to ascertain 
atmospherics ahead of January 25, without the burdens 
imposed by more traditional forms of surveillance.9 In 
essence, such maneuvers can be seen as a crude form 
of dragnet: attempts to locate and foil impending plots, 
plots that many in the regime assume are already in 
place.
It is perhaps ironic that the outcome of such escalating 
repression is to produce an external image of a 
beleaguered regime operating under the threat of 
imminent challenges to its continued rule. The Sisi 
regime has on its own managed to cultivate an image 
of weakness for itself that its opponents could not even 
dream of producing.
6The Century Foundation | tcf.org
Michael Wahid Hanna is a senior fellow at The 
Century Foundation and focuses on issues of 
international security, international law, and U.S. foreign 
policy in the broader Middle East and South Asia. 
Notes
1 Maged Atef, “Egyptian Police Are Performing Random Facebook Checks 
Ahead of Revolution Anniversary,” Buzzfeed, January 20, 2016, http://
www.buzzfeed.com/magedatef/egyptian-police-are-performing-random-
facebook-checks-ahead.
2 Ahmed Aboulenein, “Egypt: Who’s Afraid of January 25th?” Reuters, 
January 20, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-crackdown-
idUSKCN0UY169. 
3 Amr Adly, “Egypt Economy ‘Entered a Vicious Circle,’”’ al-Jazeera, 
December 10, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/analysis-
egypt-economy-entered-vicious-circle-151203112708562.html.
4 Ibid.
5 Mokhtar Awad, “Egypt’s Escalating Islamist Insurgency,” Carnegie 
Middle East Center, October 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/
CMEC_58_Egypt_Awad_Hashem_final.pdf. 
6 Ibid.
7 The Regional Center for Strategic Studies, “Cairo Index: Measuring 
Violence in Egypt,” January 17, 2016, http://www.rcssmideast.org/en/
Article/10602/Cairo-Index-Measuring-Violence-in-Egypt#.VqAiCogrKUl.
8 Although there are no current cumulative figures for recent months, 
anecdotal accounts and monitoring of both press and governmental 
sources suggest that the tempo of terrorism and anti-state violence has 
slowed in recent months.
9 Atef, “Egyptian Police Are Performing Random Facebook Checks Ahead 
of Revolution Anniversary.”
